



Terrorism and the dialectics of power-game

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Abstract

Terrorism is a thoughtful and passionately contested issue that continues to adversely affect society, thereby necessitating reflections to establish its philosophy. The article argues that terrorism is not so much about its definition, but rather its self-geared philosophy of power-game dialectics. The actors in the terrorist game posit their invented opposite as opponent in the game who exists to affirm their power. Terrorism is a highly charged self-power game and any attempt to divorce it from the power-game undertones is to miss the mark. Acts of terror are only means to achieve the desired power. The article further claims that since terrorism is rooted in the person of the “Self-for-power” to be affirmed in the person of the posited “Other” as its opposite, any attempt to find solutions to this problem should be centered upon changing the method from military interventions and policies imbued with the retaliatory undertones to society itself. The entire reflection is informed by the critical theory of society and is constructed on three aspects: the “economy” of terrorism, victory or defeat Game and possible inward-looking solutions to terrorism.

Keywords: Terrorism; Power-game; dialectics; Self-affirmation; economy of terrorism; victory or defeat; inward-looking solution

Introduction

The issue of terrorism is not so much about its definition, but rather its self-geared philosophy of power-game dialectics. Acts of terrorism are only means to achieve a self-oriented goal as an end, which is to attain social power. It is a mockup power-game where interested parties take part in a number of ways, having the entire crowd that come to watch the details of its development, applaud its success for those who support it and denounce its losses for those who do not agree with it. Many scholars argue that terrorism has religious and economic motivations that show up through the acts of violence, fear and intimidation waged against targeted innocent people. I do not dispute such assertions, but to give the manifestations of terrorism a considerable reflection would be philosophising with the subsidiaries of the game and not rethinking with the fundamental philosophical issues in it. The key actors in the terrorist game posit their invented opposite as opponent who happened to be the innocent people, deny any similarities with them, and become intolerant and aggressive towards anything outside themselves that threatens the affirmation of themselves in the power-game. The desire for power in whichever form in the self-affirmation process is the hinge upon which terrorism is constructed; it is a highly charged self-power centered game and any attempt to divorce it from the power-game undertones is to miss the mark of the game. Terrorism, therefore, is a social construct. Since terrorism is rooted in the person of the *Self-for-power* to be affirmed in the person of the posited *Other* as its opposite, any attempt to find solutions to it should point towards changing the method of fighting against it from military interventions and policies imbued with the retaliatory undertones to inward-looking nonviolent ways.

The “Economy” of Terrorism

Terrorism does not have its own religion or political territory that should be protected by its perpetrators against those who want to monopolize or invade it; neither does it possess a distinguishing badge of predictable fighter organization, but the fact of engaging States and societies with governments in a state of conflict in itself explains its institutional organization and power. It operates under the clandestine “terrorism industry” (Mueller, 2005) ^[28], charged with the recruitment of passionate supporters – including entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, and politically strong States and groups that finance it. The clandestine terrorism industry is a radicalization space where all kinds of worst-case scenarios and strategies are thought of, planned and produced. In most cases this industry is benefited by the social media as it publicly and internationally reports worst scenarios of terror attacks in the power-game. Despite lacking a political territory, it is a politically charged phenomenon and its perpetrators act in the name of some political cause or power. Religion and political boundaries are only designed platforms used by terrorists in their attempt to express themselves in the dialectic of power-game for self-recognition (De Toledo & Mitri, 2018) ^[10]. The terrorist power-game is relentlessly informed by the equivocal Machiavellian philosophy of “ends justifying the means”, where the acts of terrorism (intimidation, threats, bombings, fear, killings, and kidnappings, skyjackings,) are means to attain the desired end of a constructed powerful self of the terrorists. In this construction, such acts call for calculated hostilities between the terrorist and the targeted social groups as they plan either to attack or respond as affirmation of the power each possesses. The victims of terror are consciously posited as a

Fundamentally opposite base or formidable opponent for self-affirmation, which in essence is perceived to sustain terrorism. The victims never do anything wrong to merit terrorism acts; they are only invented and created antithesis to serve in the affirmation of self-constructed and negative power of the terrorists both in the attack and defense procedure. This fundamentally happens when retaliatory acts are to be waged against the unknown perceived enemies, which end up causing more harm to other innocent people since the real enemy is hidden, thereby continuing to affirm that self-imagined power. In the process of self-affirmation power of the terrorists in the victims, fear and pressure are necessary ingredients induced in the victims to submit to the power of terror. It is the fear of death or total obliteration of the ontological significance of the being of the victims in the social space (Kydd & Barbara, 2006) [25]. So, the victims are incorrectly conceived to exist to affirm the power of their opposing selves (terrorists) through subjugation and destruction of their existence. In the power-game, the value of life, the *self* of the victim as the recipient of terror is reduced into existential status of helplessness, hopelessness, and despair and, consequently, compelled to recognize the self-imposed power of the terrorists (Kojève, 1980). The reality of fear in the power-game is manifested in almost all terrorist attacks like in the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center and the Madrid Atocha bomb of March 2004, and those witnessed in Kenya (American Embassy, the Garissa University, the Westgate and the recent hotel Dusit in Nairobi attacks and many other terrorist attacks all over the world), which in essence are all geared towards the self-affirmative of the terrorists as they exhibit their power through massive destructions of human lives and property together with the panic, hopelessness, despair, helplessness that accompany it. It is a highly power-charged phenomenon with mockery of the legitimate social power of the affected groups or States. It is also important to note that the reaction of fear and anxiety in this power-game should not be considered merely as a negative reaction to terrorist threats and attacks. In fact, fear of danger is a very natural and useful emotional reaction which situates the victim to a particular social arrangement. This whole dialectical fear-process is succinctly explained by Bakker and Veldhuis (2012): skyjackings, threats, and bombings) to intimidate the target. The dialectic of fear of terrorism causes a shift towards dogmatic reasoning which is characterized by ‘us versus them’ thinking, stereotyping, discrimination and a lack of nuance that contributes to harsh, system-defending reactions that might do more harm than they do good. As described by Bakker and Veldhuis, the anxiety and panic of fear inflicted upon the innocent people are geared towards influencing their behavior, perceptions and beliefs of the entire society in the context of defending themselves to actually affirm the terrorists’ self-perceived power. The recognized-self (terrorists) in the desire to live, combats heroically and imaginarily becomes the master with power over the perceived social victims of their terrorist acts. Under this arrangement, acts of terror are not ultimately directed towards the innocent people, but towards the terrorists themselves, such that to sustain the pretentious and desired power, and for their own survival, terrorists must constantly invent their own enemies (victims of terror) and lure them and their governments to acts of brutality in their

attempt to defend themselves (Kydd & Barbara, 2006) [25]. Another fundamental fact that should not be left unattended is that, the “quest for relevance” and recognition (Kruglanski, *et al*, 2013) [23] of the terrorists equally and reflexively works against them. As they engage in wiping out their self-constructed enemies, they similarly lose their own presupposed dignity, independence and consequently are reduced from conscious and independent social groups and persons to a ‘thing’ or objects of social destruction, lacking their own autonomy except the fear given to them by the victims of their attacks; terrorists eventually become victims and slaves serving their own power-game ideology evidenced in the embracement of death in the self-suicide attacks. Terrorism cannot, therefore, be conceived of without the dialectics of power-game – the *self* of the terrorists as the exhibiter of power and the victim as the constructed opposite that affirms that power; without it, terrorism will be irrelevant in society. The violence against targeted groups should not be conceived for other reasons other than that of the desire for self-affirmation power against those whom that perceived power is contrasted. On the flipside of it, the affected groups and States in turn continue inventing ways to fight back the terrorists to equally affirm the threatened power, which consequently keeps the terrorist destructive project alive and continue exerting pressure on society as their perceived non-self. Terrorism should not be conceived to be the game of weak actors against the so called stronger societies or political regimes, for in the power-game, all actors are involved – including those who come to assess and determine the development of the game. The dialectics of power-game is not really to achieve a higher or better politically integral society as conceived by Socrates, Plato, Hegel, etc., but rather destruction without general social agreement of the players in the power-game. Terrorism does not reasonably follow the triadic development of Hegel’s philosophical system where the outcome of the social conflict is conceived to give rise to a higher and better society that comes about as synthesis of the initial conflicting pair. In Hegel’s dialectics, destruction of the opposing *other* is not at play; the opposing other equally contributes in affirmative manner to the final synthesis or agreement in the conflict process.

Is it Victory or Defeat Game? By Who?

Above, it has been argued that terrorism is a calculatedly constructed phenomenon for self-power affirmation. But, the basic questions are: Should legitimate recognition be given to terrorists in order to affirm their forcefully self-given power? Who wins the power-game? Could this not be an illusory power-game that would eventually end without losers and/or winners? These questions appear to be easy, but in essence they are not. The answers to them are left to the readers. As they search for answers it should be noted that terrorism is not a mathematical equation, rather a tactical socially constructed problem. All over the world there exist terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, the Islamic State West Africa Province and the Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, Al-Qaeda, ISIS, ISIL, Taliban, etc. These groups continue to launch serious attacks against innocent populations causing massive loss of human lives and destruction of property, including their economies. They have the power to shakeup

the peace of States and communities and perturb lives of affected populations. At the same time, military counter attacks are constantly waged against these groups, with considerably little success, making it appear as if terrorists are victorious over the fight against their targets. Legal regimes, States and populations are pushed into a tight corner where they are left on the defensive side of the power-game for their own survival. In the 9/11 attack of World Trade Centre, the al-Qaida group led by Osama bin Laden managed to put the US – the world's superpower and everybody else into fear, panic and confusion. This single attack occasioned excessive emotional and physical response from the US government and from the rest of the world. On the flipside of it, instead of investigating the root causes of the attack, the Bush administration deceptively declared it an act of war against the US government, citizens and consequently a test to their world power. Using the same power-game dynamic of brutality, in retaliation, war was declared against al-Qaida – an invisible terrorist group. The US retaliation claimed far more innocent human lives in Afghanistan, Iraq and other parts of the world than those lost in the terrorist attack. But this emotionally charged and un-reflected military retaliatory demonstrated massive failures of the US government's abilities; it further demonstrated a battle lost in the war against terrorism. Influenced by the same dialectic of power-game for self-affirmation, the US continue to militarily intervene in other countries as was shown in Libya, Syria, Nigeria, Somalia, etc. But the notable fact is that military interventions create favorable conditions for more terrorist re-groupings in the power-game struggle, where the terrorist mobilize themselves and recruit more passionate supporters to put their self-invented opponents in the power-game under duress (Pape, 2005) ^[31]. The regrouping of and the rejoining of forces enable them to have the power to deplete the self-created opponent of his valuable powers and eventually contributing to his defeat (Bueno de Mesquita & Dickson, 2007) ^[9]. In the power-game, terrorists use the power of unrealistic demands to show their victory over their perceived enemies; they design new forms of operations as a means that tend to diminish the political power of the targeted States or groups and threaten them to give in to their demands (Dode & Ufomba, 2014) ^[33]. This is displayed whenever there is an attack, where terrorists tend to present unrealistic demands, issue public statements and defend the attack as they justify their cause. For instance, in the case of Iraq, the terrorists demanded that for the hostages to be freed, the US should withdraw its workers (or your troops) from Iraq, if not, then they will be killed. A Jordanian catering firm complied with the demands of abductors of two of its employees to halt working with American forces in Iraq (Fisher, 2008) ^[13]. In the Madrid-Atocha train station terrorist attack in March 2004 was demanding an inducement to the government to pull out its troops from Iraq. This was later followed by June 2004, terrorists beheading a South Korean captive in Iraq, after the South Korean government snubbed to consent to their demand to stop the deployment of more troops to Iraq. The assassination attracted a considerable mass media attention, thereby compelling the national assembly of South Korea to ratify the president's decision to send more troops to Iraq (Brooke, 2004) ^[6]. Such demands are apparently calculated to shake away the power of the government,

institutions and populations living them with a self-intimidating dilemma whether to comply or not to those demands, and also to prove their power over them. This demand ploy is to instill fear and paralyze the infrastructural operations of their target and to blackmail their posited enemy (government and community) to capsulate (Cohan, 2006), ^[7] and eventually lose their political and social space, and the power to fight against terrorism (Piazza & Walsh, 2009) ^[32]. The incontestable fact is that both foreign and local investments in areas of terrorist attacks are negatively affected leading to their withdrawal due to their susceptibility to terrorist attacks (Kay, 2004) ^[20]. This threatens the affected States' and communities' economic power. Companies are forced to pull out from the insecure areas. For instance in the North of Spain as a result frequent attack by the terrorist group called ETA, companies pulled out (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2002) ^[1]. Insecurity has adversely affected the strongest world economies. The terrorist attack of 9/11 strongly affected the US economy paralyzing the transport industry, where the government and airlines had to spend a lot more money on precautions against terrorism. It is estimated to have cost the United States about 80 to 90 billion US dollars and significantly reducing global investment the levels (Kunreuther, *et al.*, 2003) ^[24]. The IMF estimates that the US losses 75 billion dollars annually as a result of terrorism, which include security costs, investments, etc. As Enders and Sandler (2012) assert there continues to be a long-term, serious disruption of the American economy. This position is emphatically explained Bernstein (2005) when he notes: Bin Laden has alluded to the success of the September 11 attacks in producing the United States' budget and trade deficits and has said that al Qaeda is committed 'to continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy'. The indubitable fact is that terrorist attacks disrupt economic processes and activities, which may not only be confined to terrorized economy itself, but may spill over to other activities, sectors and economies. This is fundamentally echoed by David Banks (2002), who noted: If terrorists force us to redirect resources away from sensible programs and future growth, in order to pursue unachievable but politically popular levels of domestic security, then they have won an important victory that mortgages our future. Terrorists have the power to weaken the economic strength of any society and States, including the most powerful ones, such that they spend more of their economic resources in security to protect their assets, businesses, local companies (Brandt & Sandler, 2010) ^[5] and deviate terror to other countries. Terrorism is capable of changing the power of legitimate regimes (Toros, 2008) ^[38]. This happened in Spain, and is happening in Syria. The 2004 Madrid train bombing previously alluded to is a better case to explain what appears to be the victory of terrorism. The attack was occasioned by the government's adamant support of the US invasion of into Iraq under the pretext of fighting against terrorism. It happened three days prior to the Spanish general elections, with 2000 casualties, including 191 deaths (William & Murphy, 2007) ^[39]. This occasioned emotional reaction of the Spaniards and the sitting government (Popular Party) lost the elections to the Socialist Party. Terrorists use all possible strategies to convince the public that they are powerfully victorious than their created or posited enemies. Such acts are

meant to wreak pain in a cost-effective way and giving them heightened appeals (Kydd & Barbara, 2006)^[25], which tend to help the terrorists subsist in their intent to win the desired power. The extremeness of the methods used to elicit political change signals inherently extreme political intentions; while raising awareness over grievances and make them appear legitimate, terrorism makes them look extreme (Max, 2012)^[27]. They are acts of provocation for the aggrieved to blame their authorities for the shutdown, rather than the terrorist groups that motivated it. They are acts that occasion governments to wage retaliatory measures thereby making the terrorists relevant to their cause. Forced by the thesis of necessity, the civil society is compelled to allow terrorist groups to operate. As claimed by Napoleoni (2016, p. 18), the reports from residents of territories under ISIS domination have indicated that the arrival of the group is prompted by the peoples' lack of faith in their own government; this convinces the people to favor more extreme voices that promise development, law and order. The ISIS is believed to have brought improvements in administration and in the daily functioning of its villages. ISIS (Ibid) has renovated roads and highways, improvised free community kitchens and looked to guarantee the supply of energy. Furthermore, it has also provided social programs, such as vaccination campaigns. Today, politically powerful States as well as those labelled to be condemned to servitude in the third world countries may today be physically secure, but under the intrigue of terrorism, they are all alike; they are all paralyzed by the culture of fear and intimidation (Furedi, 2007)^[15]. This is manifest when countries amplify border defenses in the hopes of deflecting possible attackers to other countries. They seem to operate under the Nietzschean morality of master and slave, where the master self-proclaimed is capable of instilling fear upon the slaves who are the recipients of that fear. For the terrorists, the terror experienced by the targeted social groups is itself considered a success. Members of al-Qaeda (Hoffman, 2002)^[19], for instance regard themselves legitimate freedom fighters, and they have made clear that their objective is to attack the political, social, and economic structures of the West so as to thwart perceived inequity, tyranny, or injustice. Furthermore, they are induced to review their policies to accommodate the reality of terrorism; we find political bargains and agreements being made with the terrorist groups and citizens for the establishment of new government arrangements and the provision of services to the afflicted communities they presupposedly claim to serve (De Toledo & Mitri, 2018)^[10].

The above are strategies meant to lure the governments or affected targets to make agreements or provoke them to retaliate. Whatever action they take, the terrorists go further to expand their bargaining position as they received concessions or suffered retaliation, which would increase the public's support of the terrorist cause (Lake, 2002)^[26]. Similarly, any inaction from the government undermines its power and demonstrates it to be incapable of protecting its population – a principal goal of any State. This seems to indicate the successful power of the terrorists over the established political regimes. This loss of power by legal regimes provides the citizens the avenue to alienate them, which consequently makes them susceptible to any ideology that appears to offer

solutions to their problems. Even though there could be benefits of terror groups to society as seen in Syria, it is unacceptable to use terrorism to achieve social change. Terrorists can fight for a right cause like political liberation of some specific societies or states, but it is more of incorrect utilitarianism with Machiavellian absolutist imprints of “ends justifying the means” for whichever preconceived social change. It is unacceptable to use impunity to attain power. It doesn't matter how much benefits terrorism can bring to society since the life lost does not equate those benefits. Profoundly, the use of terrorism denotes an attempt to use humans as a means to certain preconceived ends, delegitimize the concept of sovereignty in the people and the structure of the State system itself. The inducement of governments and societies to capitulate to their ambivalent cause is a very disturbing trend, particularly when it comes to instrumentalization of humans and establishment of a solid society (Enders, *et al.*, 2011)^[11]. The incontestable fact is that terrorism appears to push States and governments to a corner of helplessness to the height that the only thing they are left with is to use their resources to defend themselves. Powerful nations posited as the enemies are ironically put by terrorists in the state of self-defense, which appears to justify their strength; the terrorists are seen as the attackers, while their opponents are set in the position of self-defense. To be pushed to such a level would mean the affirmation of the power claimed by the terrorists. But, if this is true, then questions asked at the beginning of this discussion are answered.

Inward-looking Solutions

Above, it has been discussed that terrorism is deeply a social problem motivated by power-games, and that it has destroyed the organizational fabric of society. However, the solution to this problem cannot be found outside the dialectical nature of the very society that is equally affected by it. Terrorism and its acts of self-manifestation are all about the failure of human reason in the attempt to find amicable ways of presenting issues affecting society. This failure of reason is not only for the terrorists, but equally for those who choose to fight back using the same terror dynamic. Confrontational military retaliations are old-fashioned means to fight against any act of terror in a scientific and technologically informed society that calls more for the use of reason and outshine emotions in solving societal problems. Military (Schwenkenbercher, 2012) responses in essence generate more retaliatory arrangements from either side, thereby giving rise to continuity of terror; they further manifest the desperation and inadequacies in the entire process of looking for all inclusive solutions. Therefore, processes to counter terrorism should not have traits of terrorism tactics and liking that display the use of power that is desired by the same terrorists. Any attempt to live with the fallacy that the use of weaponry and military interventions will help in winning the war against terrorism is illusory. If the use of force is in question, then the entire organization of society is challenged to seek for qualitative approaches that will transform the fight against terrorism and outshine the quantitative military methods. By this claim, I don't mean that affected States and societies should out-rightly not physically defend themselves from terrorists; for to do so will be unreasonable. My argument is that since military interventions

seem to indicate massive failures, we should think of nonviolent and self-looking mechanisms in fighting against terrorism. This calls for society's self-examination since best solutions are always found within the self and not outside of the self. Sometimes, the enemy could be the same self, fighting aggressively against outside forces to affirm its threatened power. Nevertheless, the fundamental question is: Which are these qualitative and nonviolent ways that can be used to fight against terrorism? In the preceding subsections, it has been discussed that terrorism represents a form of psychological warfare aimed at achieving power goals under the pretext of expressing socio-political grievances. This is something that the political society at large should recognize and candidly address. As a psychological warfare, it appeals to the emotional reactions of the involved parties than reason-based responses. Any response to terror attacks, needs to consciously reconsider reducing fear and anxiety among members of society; this is quite central in dealing with terrorism. Terrorism can be defeated simply by not becoming terrified and by resisting the temptation to overreact. This assertion is in agreement with Friedman (2003, 32) who aptly puts that "one way to disarm terrorists is to convince regular Americans to stop worrying about them." But how can this be achieved amidst confusion of terror attack? Sober reactions should include an effort by the political class, bureaucrats, and the media to inform the public reasonably and realistically about the context of terror incidents instead of playing into the hands of terrorists by seeking to terrify the public. Anybody in the position of leadership should not be the agent of fear that give powerful publicity to incidents of terrorist attacks. In a profound manner, fear and publicity are unwarranted reactions that give inflicted wounds to the victims and a sense of power to the terrorists (Ibidem). Society and its organization are challenged not to encourage in whichever means the ideology of terrorism designed provoke determined emotional responses from the victims of attacks. Society has also to admit that today's problems are fundamentally political; politics have become an enemy of the self/society and no longer a solution to the problems affecting the self. Some of the homegrown terrorists groups are as a result of poor self-governing systems – totalitarian, self-gloried and unjust regimes that want to monopolize power, including world power at the expense of the people they deceitfully govern. States and the political societies are therefore challenged to re-examine their systems of leadership and governance that appeal to political organization of the postmodern technological societies, where the acceptance of diversities is considered an indispensable value for the achievement of unity. It defeats reason when the political class make international utterances against other perceived States, social groups and races. The typical example of this is the power attitude of the US president Trump, which undermines the sovereignty of other States and races. Some states like Sudan, Syria, etc., employ despotic and oppressive styles of governance to serve particular interests of the ruling class. Such defective governance systems give a leeway to groups that tend to use terror to defend their cause, abused selves or to ascend to office on the grounds of bringing change to society. Re-examination of leadership methods calls for decisive leaders who see their responsibility as a selfless duty

to serve society with less intrigues that hurt their collective conscience. This is where the political class is challenged to take the insights from the philosophies of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle who understood politics as service and the achievement of the common good. To these thinkers, society is constructed upon ethical principles upheld by all actors in the socio-political sphere. World leaders are challenged to see their role in building an ethical community or society and not abuse their positions for individual self-gratification at the expense of the ruled. Political leadership should not be the hybrid for terrorist feelings and organizations; leaders should know themselves and uphold knowledge, truth and honesty for right living for all members of society, without exclusion of any social group or race. Political inclusivity is a component of social cohesion and a cure to its antithesis. It is quite unfortunate that the context of world political blocks that are formed is of power-games (in whichever form of their manifestation) which ostracizes those states and groups that do not fit in that power-game. But this, in the dialectics of power, inevitably produces its antithesis manifested in the anger of terrorist groups that identify themselves with the ostracized societies. This entire dialectical process is not for the integration of society as a Whole, but rather a working against the *self* of society that should benefit from the diversities of the social groups that constitute it. There are those who think that terrorism can be fought with law enforcement and that States should come up with stringent policies to restrain terrorism. Again, this is leaving in self-deception. Today, it is almost ineffective to think of law enforcement as a way to counteract the displayed power of terrorism. The discussion from the preceding sub-sections indicated terrorists having more strength in their defiance to the rule of law; even within States, the dialectics of power-game seem to overtake the power of the rule of law. Faulty design and application of the law would increase legislative fear and consequently a multiplication of policies to manage the divergent manifestations and faces of terrorism. Moreover, we cannot have polices to an infinitum. Policies in themselves are inadequate to address the problem of terrorism (Shreyasi, 2014) ^[36]. There is no doubt that law and policies can incapacitate, deter and even punish those involved in terror activities, but on the contrary they equally serve to increase arrests and detentions, which further may become breeding grounds for hatred, retaliations, counter reactions, etc. The inadequacies of law and polices are explicit in situations where the terrorists are ready to face any action including losing their own lives for their cause. Therefore, law and policies should be supplemented by other all-inclusive approaches like negotiation, mediation within the context of the growing security social consciousness. Equivocally, the use of law to fight terrorism in most erroneous cases is to show the power of the legal systems of the so-called "powerful societies". Even in those societies, the use of criminal law paradigm is an outmoded approach with very little outcomes in the fight against terrorism. Above, it has been argued that terrorists engage in violent attacks as a provocation or incitement to governments and societies to respond or even a lead towards changing the established political order. This brings in an important issue of the positive contribution negotiations with terrorists can give in

solving the problem of security. Negotiations are a powerful dialectical tool where the self of the terrorist and the inflicted target bring together their diverse views for discussion to find ground solutions to what generated terrorism. It is a complementary strategy to other employed counter terrorism measures (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005) ^[8]. The reliability of this tool is that terrorists who are perceived to be a social problem are made indispensable part of the solution; they are made to take a meaningful social responsibility in the problems of social security. This is not just to end acts of violence, but fundamentally to minimize the danger of setting precedence to terrorist formations that would destabilize socio-political arrangements that are fundamental to society (Toros, 2008) ^[38]. In negotiating with them, particularly if they are homegrown terrorists, their grievances are listened and resolutely addressed by those given the responsibility to do so. Unfortunately, there are those with diametrically opposed stances, postulating that governments and society in general should never negotiate with terrorist organizations since such negotiations psychologically suggest the recognition of their dreadful power (Ibidem). They further advance the position that terrorist organizations and related States should be blacklisted, isolated, excluded, stigmatized and delegitimized. Such radical and exclusivist stances are motivated by the fear of bringing on the table different divergent and opposing views, including those of the perceived enemy, thereby impoverishing the attempts to fully understand terrorists' philosophical operations. Stances that do not give way to negotiations are defective and stimulate more aggressive reprisals from the terrorists. Whether in the context of terrorists taking hostages or not, resolute negotiations outweigh the cost incurred and those yet to be incurred in the act of terrorism (Harvey & Sandler, 1988) ^[18]. In truthful, sincere and well wished negotiations there should be no power-game since the inclusion of terrorists in the social discourse resolves the unilateralist and monopolistic tendencies of the powerful States or societies (with their self-perceived power) that possibly and indirectly contributed to the formation of terrorist groups. This position is in disagreement with those who postulate that exclusion of terrorists deny them the possibility to engage in further violence, thereby transforming them into a legitimate group (Gross, 2011) ^[17]. Such an argument is disingenuous and unsound; exclusion is a negative and uncompromising way of solving the problem of terrorism, while negotiations in their comprehensive arrangements are inclusive and accommodative informed by the ethical value of tolerance of the opposing other in the social space. Genuine negotiations are a path to peace since they reduce terrorists' radical feelings of not being listened to by those supposed to listen to them and the consequent recourse to violence against innocent members of society. Furthermore, negotiations act as a moderating factor that incentivizes the terrorists groups from within themselves that may be willing to turn away from violence (Sullivan & Hayes, 2010) ^[37]. Another most imperative component in the fight against terrorism is that of civil society and the construction of local community resilience. War against terrorism challenges the hinge of civil society as well as its aptitude to respond to threats as antithesis of the terrorists' construction of power-game. Today, society

has to admit that radicalization of those willing to join terrorism is fundamentally a local power-game industry, where members of local communities, their kinsfolks and friends, are better placed to know those working and applying to work in that terrorist industry. To get the intrigues of such power industry, civil actors like NGOs, religious groups, local media organizations, grass-roots organizations, and advocacy networks are crucial platforms that have the benefit to increase community resilience in findings solutions to terrorism (Gervasoni, 2017) ^[16]. The diversity of these platforms gives the civil society a wide understanding of the local dynamics, tendencies and drivers of terrorism, thereby helping to avert known individuals from engaging in terrorism. The civil society in its commitment to the common good has the capacity to detect individuals with terrorist compartments and activities that may pose a threat to the social fabric. Optimally, the consciousness of the civil society arrangements can deny terrorists the social means, space and opportunities to carry out their organizational terrorist activities since it is able to share related information. It is better placed to counter proportionally and quickly in an orderly manner to terrorist attacks than the political and military approaches. More fundamentally, civil society represents an inclusive and a whole-of-society approach, explicitly manifesting a force for people-centered security. Its operations create security social consciousness on radicalization and recruitment dynamics, highlighting successful prevention and intervention measures in the local as well international levels, thereby not permitting the ideology of terrorism to take effect in society (Kiranda, 2017) ^[21]. It has the capacity to undermine the ill-vested power and ideologies of the terrorists, and create a common social security identity and sense of purpose among potential terrorist recruits (Organization for Security & Co-operation, 2018) ^[30]. In other words, civil society in its diversified operations has the power to intrinsically reinforce community resilience to terrorism. It is fundamental to note that the inclusion of civil society and community resilience in the fight against terrorism demands those in leadership to partner and cooperate with those they govern/civil society; it further challenges the States' monopoly of security powers and counterbalances the unilateralist war approach pursued by States who think and deceptively glory in their military power. In essence, the political class are to understand that a proper fight against terrorism needs investments not in military or police intelligence, but in human social intelligence empowerment to enable members of the public infiltrate and collect information that are of relevance to social security. This should be the noblest thing to do in a society where everybody feels insecure. The political society should invest in the civil social fabric as a ground step in building resilience in the public and outdo any feelings of retribution from the same civil society. Feelings of threat from the public in the fight against terrorism polarizes and emasculates public trust, thereby leading to self-defeat in the necessary fight against terrorism.

Conclusion

The article has emphasized that terrorism is sustained by the philosophy of power; it is a power charged game, where its perpetrators posit their self-antithesis to affirm the power they

postulate to have; the acts of terror are forms of manifestations of the power-game. Terrorism has the power to destroy and change legal political regimes, the economy and the social fabric of many societies that are affected by it. It is a phenomenon that is radically opposed to idea of the common good as the basis of society. The reflection has further displayed that in the absence of the common social good, the costs of terrorism despicably comes with fear and the consequent reaction, which if not well designed has the same outcomes like those of terror itself. Humans cannot be used as means to achieve the ends of power of particular socio-political groups, rather should be perceived as the purpose of any political formation. For this to be achieved, adequate solutions to terrorism should focus on re-examining society itself – its socio-political systems; they should be more of inward-looking solutions that are open to dialogue with terrorist agents in the attempt to build a common consent on the problem of terrorism. The article has accentuated the need for a whole-of-society assertiveness to the problem of terrorism.

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